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INTRODUCTION
The right to counsel has been described as critical to our "universal sense of
justice";' an "obvious truth"; the "foundation for our adversary system";' a
weapon of antidiscrimination; 4 and the "gateway right" through which other
rights are made real.s It is regarded as a right without peer, even in a field of
litigation saturated with constitutional protections. But from this elevated, elite
status, the right to counsel casts a shadow over the other, less prominent
criminal procedural rights. Elaborating on this paradoxical aspect of the Gideon
right-that the very prominence of the right tends to dilute other rights, or at
least justify limitations on them -this Essay analyzes the judicial and scholarly
practice of employing the right to counsel as a cudgel to curb other rights.
Whether it is viewed as causing limitations on other rights, or simply
justifying and entrenching such limits, Gideon's shadow takes two related but
distinct forms. First, in some instances it functions in a comparative sense such
that the right in question is deemed undeserving of vindication because,
compared to Gideon, the other right is too insubstantial and unrelated to
innocence to warrant constitutional remediation. It may well be that Gideon is a
much more important right in many such cases, but the point here is to
illustrate the role of Gideon as a lever for limiting other rights. Specifically,
courts and scholars have identified Gideon as the paradigmatic protection of the
innocent, the strongest conduit to justice, and the best insurance of procedural
fairness, and they have defended and justified harsh limitations on non-Gideon
rights that compare unfavorably to Gideon in one or all of these respects.
Second, in other contexts, the right to counsel has a substitutive effect insofar
as impediments to various non-Gideon rights are regarded as defensible
precisely because the right to counsel adequately safeguards innocence,
fundamental fairness, and the accuracy of the trial process. In either form,
then, Gideon is distinguished from other rights because of its perceived
relationship to innocence and fairness -that is, Gideon is used as a vehicle for
1. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 476 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). It was Justice Black's dissent
in Betts that laid the doctrinal groundwork for a unanimous decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
3. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
4. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997).
s. Justin F. Marceau, Embracing A New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 116l, 1162 n.5 (2012) (citing James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of
the Right to Counsel Against Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C.




justifying limitations on non-Gideon rights by focusing our attention on certain
normative values that are best protected by Gideon itself.
Notably, however, the limits flowing from Gideon's shadow are justified by
an idealized, abstract conception of Gideon, and thus stand in stark contrast to
the recognition that Gideon has functioned as an important decision of
principle, not practice. Specifically, the indigent defense system spurred by
Gideon has itself been deemed "a national crisis" by commentators and judges.'
The problem identified in this Essay, then, is twofold: the right to counsel's
presumed prominence justifies imposing limitations on other rights, but the
right to counsel's reality is itself an unfulfilled, illusory promise. Practically
speaking, Gideon creates a small right, but casts a massive shadow.
To develop this claim and provide some optimism about where Gideon will
take us next, the Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview
and tribute to the judicial and scholarly recognition that Gideon is the most
prominent criminal procedure right. The focus here is on the rhetoric rather
than the reality of Gideon because it is the idealized conception of Gideon,
unencumbered by resource and other pragmatic constraints, that makes
plausible the claim that the right to counsel is more important than all other
criminal procedural rights. Part II identifies several concrete examples of
Gideon's shadow effect, whereby a variety of limitations on non-Gideon rights
are defended or justified because of Gideon's comparative or substitutive
shadows. Finally, in Part III, I propose a reading of Gideon that facilitates
rather than impedes the development of other rights, and I identify two recent
cases that resonate with this approach. These two cases provide a modicum of
optimism that Gideon is being disentangled from innocence and accuracy.
I. GIDEON AS THE GREATEST RIGHT
Although the full promise of Gideon has never come to bloom, at least as a
rhetorical matter, the case instantly entered the pantheon of great cases and
6. See, e.g., ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-aid indigent-defendant
sAs sclaid def bp right_to_counsel in-criminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf; Mary Sue
Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57
HASTINGs L.J. 1031, 1054-57 (2006); Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 597, 598 (2011) ("No symposium designed to address crises in the legal
profession would be complete without a discussion of our systematic failure to provide
competent legal representation to criminal defendants.").
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never receded.! In Gideon, a unanimous Supreme Court described the right to
appointed counsel as necessary to the great and "noble ideal" of fair trials,' and
almost overnight the right became a symbol of America's success as a nation.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy remarked within months of the Gideon
decision that it had fundamentally changed "the whole course of American
legal history."' Similarly, in 1964, Abe Krash wrote that Gideon reflects our
Cold War sense of competition insofar as "it stands as a notice that in the free
world no man shall be condemned to penal servitude without a lawyer to
defend him.""o
The rhetoric surrounding the right has also enjoyed a unique ability to
avoid vacillation and diminution over time. Whereas most Warren Court
criminal procedure innovations, such as the exclusionary rule and Miranda, are
under constant assault from the courts and the public, "no one seeks to
overrule" Gideon; "the validity of Gideon-at least as an abstract matter-is
universally accepted.""
There is good reason for the uniquely forceful and sustained celebration of
the Gideon ideal. As the Court itself explained, "the Sixth Amendment stands as
a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost,
justice will not . .. be done."" More generally, Gideon is conceived of as a right
without rival because of its procedural trifecta: Gideon is regarded as the most
fundamental check on unfairness at trial," Gideon is the strongest protection for
7. The rhetoric used to describe Gideon's promise has previously been identified as an example
of "absolutist rhetoric about rights," which necessarily fails to comport with practical
realities of the criminal justice system. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives ofRights: The
Rhetoric and Practice ofRights in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 278, 285-86 (2010) ("Rights
lead dual lives, much like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Perhaps the Jekyll is the right's luminous
place in our rhetoric and the Hyde is the right as it exists on the streets."); id. at 285-86
("[T]he Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright, recognized the right to counsel as
'fundamental,' and since then, American rhetoric has hailed Gideon's 'promise of equal
justice' as one of the most important in the criminal justice system." (citations omitted)).
8. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
9. Eric H. Holder Jr., Gideon-A Watershed Moment, CHAMPION, June 2012,
http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=24999 (quoting Robert Kennedy).
10. Abe Krash, The Right to a Lawyer: The Implications of Gideon v. Wainwright, 39 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 150, 154 (1964).
11. Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon's Paradox, 73 FoRDHAML. REv. 955, 960 (2004).
12. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
13. The Court has explained that counsel is "necessary to insure [the] fundamental human




the innocent,14 and Gideon is the primary point of entry for most other
constitutional protections."s Speaking to this latter quality, Yale Kamisar has
described Gideon as the "master key to all the rules and procedures" of the
criminal trial.
In short, although Gideon's promise has been substantially unfulfilled, 7 the
public acceptance and symbolic meaning of this canonical right cannot be
gainsaid.'" In the abstract, Gideon stands as the most important constitutional
protection for criminal defendants. Gideon is uniquely capable of protecting the
innocent and promoting accuracy of result. 9 The point of this essay, however,
is not to reiterate or challenge Gideon's primacy among rights, but rather to
draw attention to its use as a justification for the curtailment of other rights.
II. GIDEON OVERSHADOWING OTHER RIGHTS
The mismatch between the ideal and the real in the Gideon context is itself
cause for concern. The right to counsel as hailed by courts and commentators is
significantly different than the reality of the right's application. The problem is
amplified, however, when an abstract or symbolic conception of Gideon is used
as the justification for limiting other rights -the ideal impacts the real. In this
Section I will outline four examples where Gideon has emerged as a lever for
14. Some might balk at the notion that Gideon is an innocence-serving right, but the Court is
unequivocal on this point. Id. at 345 ("[W]ithout [counsel], though [the accused] be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence." (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932))).
15. Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (And For Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. RE.
1227, 1232 (2010) ("Gideon is a little bit like Brown v. Board ofEducation. It may not have been
consistent with the original understanding of the Constitution, but it is hard to argue in
retrospect that it was not absolutely the right decision." (citations omitted)); Bennett L.
Gershman, Judicial Interference with Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 PACE L. REV. 56o, 56o
(2011) ("Of all the rights that an accused person possesses, the right to counsel is by far the
most important because it affects the ability to assert all other rights.").
16. Panel Discussion, Gideon at 4o: Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the Promise, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
135, 150-51 (2004).
17. Backus & Markus, supra note 6, at 1121-22.
is. Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 35, 49-50 (1991).
ig. The emphasis on protecting the innocent is peculiar because Clarence Earl Gideon himself
may not have had a compelling case of actual innocence. See Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting
the Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for
Targeting Justice, 75 Mo. L. REv. 931, 953 (2010) ("The defense case did not try to prove
Gideon's innocence but rather invoked a defense based on reasonable doubt that centered
upon the weakness of the state's proof.").
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reducing the likelihood of vindicating other rights. In addition to the judicial
doctrines, I will provide two illustrative examples of scholarly works that also
invoke Gideon as a justification for limiting other rights.
A. Judicial Doctrines Developed in the Shadow of Gideon
1. Retroactivity
There are several judicial doctrines in the realm of postconviction litigation
that explain or justify a limitation on the vindication of non-Gideon rights by
reference to Gideon itself.20 An illustrative example is the law of retroactivity,
which applies Gideon's comparative shadow. In this context, because other
rights do not enjoy the same canonical status, they are deemed less deserving of
retroactive application. In addition, the law of retroactivity provides an insight
into why Gideon is generally deemed comparatively more important: Gideon is
understood as protecting the innocent and improving the accuracy of trials.
The Court's current retroactivity doctrine was announced in Teague v. Lane,
just after the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Gideon decision." The rule is easily
paraphrased: nothing is as important as Gideon, so nothing is retroactive. More
precisely, under Teague, a new rule of procedure does not apply to a criminal
conviction that is final unless it is a "watershed rule[] of criminal procedure."2 2
Merely being fundamental "in some abstract sense is not enough," rather a rule
is regarded as a watershed only if it implicates "the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding."" A watershed rule of procedure, then, is a
rule that protects the innocence-serving function of the trial and the basic
fairness of the proceedings. Gideon, the Court has repeatedly told us, concerns
the quintessential example of a right that safeguards the accuracy and
innocence-protecting function of the trial."' Indeed, although Gideon was
decided long before the current retroactivity doctrine was announced, the
Court has described Gideon as "the only case that th[e] Court has identified as
qualifying under this exception.""
zo. This is paradoxical because Gideon itself was decided on certiorari review from a denial of
postconviction relief; it was a postconviction, or habeas, case.
21. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 311.
23. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at
313).
24. See, e.g., Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996) (referring to the Gideon rule as a
"paradigmatic example" of the second Teague exception).




Thus, by relying on Gideon in the abstract- that is, the rhetoric of Gideon as
a pillar of accuracy and fairness -the Court has curtailed the content of other
rights in reality. Stated more directly, it is as though Gideon's "noble ideal,"
divorced from the reality of underfunding, is the measuring stick by which
other procedural rights are evaluated. Not surprisingly, with Gideon in the
abstract as the comparative standard, the Court has confidently posited that "it
is unlikely that any. . .watershed rule[] ha[s] yet to emerge., 6
To date, the Court's retroactivity cases confirm the self-fulfilling conclusion
that other rights, because they are not sufficiently linked to the accuracy of the
trial and the protection of the innocent, do not warrant retroactivity under
Teague. 7 For example, in refusing to extend watershed status to one of the
hallmarks of the modern criminal trial, the Court explained that "[t]he
Crawford rule is in no way comparable to the Gideon rule."" The confrontation
right announced in Crawford, the Court observed, "is much more limited in
scope [than Gideon], and the relationship of that rule to the accuracy of the
factfinding process is far less direct and profound." 9 Likewise, in Schriro v.
Summerlin, the Court held that the Teague exception is "extremely narrow" and
explained that non-Gideon rights simply do not have a sufficient relationship to
accuracy and innocence.30 Only Gideon violations, the Court reasoned, seriously
diminish the "likelihood of an accurate conviction."" A range of other rights
have come before the Supreme Court after Teague, and in every single case the
Court deemed the right nonretroactive because it was less important than the
26. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n.7 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243 (1990)).
27. Lower courts and scholars, of course, have followed suit and embraced the primacy of
Gideon as a product of the right's perceived relationship to protecting the innocent. See, e.g.,
Barry C. Scheck & Sarah L. Tofte, Gideon's Promise and the Innocent Defendant, CHAMPION,
Feb. 2003, at 38, 40 (recognizing Gideon's enormous potential "to protect [the] innocent").
28. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419 (noting that a watershed rule is one that "implicates the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding" because it is necessary to
prevent an unacceptably large risk of an inaccurate conviction).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (explaining that most rights have a "more
speculative connection to innocence" and that it is unlikely that any more procedural rights
will, like Gideon, be deemed to be retroactive).
31. Id. In addition, commentators who have rejected the retroactive application of the modern
sentencing revolution, initiated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), have said
that Apprendi lacks the "primacy" of Gideon, in part because it does not have any role in
protecting the "blameless from punishment." See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Apris Apprendi, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 331, 333 (2000).
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accuracy- and innocence-protecting values served by Gideon." Notably, the
Court has even developed a familiar, explicitly Gideon-centered formula for the
Teague analysis: "[w]hatever one may think of the importance of [the right in
question], it has none of the primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in
Gideon."3  Moreover, lower courts have described Gideon as the Teague
"exception that proves the exception," noting that when it comes to watershed
rules "there are new rules [that will not be retroactive], and then there are new
Gideon-extension rules [that are retroactive]."3
In short, retroactivity doctrine has been shaped by the caricature of Gideon.
It is the abstract or idealized conception of Gideon-its primacy, scope, and
innocence-serving function-that justifies limiting the vindication of other
rights."s In a sense, the celebrated rhetoric of Gideon has been co-opted in the
service of justifying doctrines like Teague. This is not to say that Gideon's
promise is not more important and more central to the role of protecting
accuracy and innocence than other rights. Nor do I suggest that overruling
Gideon is a plausible cure for the narrow scope of the Teague doctrine-
32. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (declining to retroactively apply a new
rule of constitutional criminal procedure regulating jury instructions in capital murder
cases); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539 (1997) (denying retroactive application of a
prohibition on weighing invalid aggravating factors in capital sentencing); Sawyer v. Smith,
497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990) (refusing to retroactively apply a due process rule barring
prosecutors from misleading juries about their power to determine the appropriateness of a
death sentence); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (holding that a prior decision
requiring that the jury be allowed to base its sentencing decision in a capital case upon
sympathy it feels for the defendant was not a watershed rule).
33. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495; see also Beard, 542 U.S. at 407 (noting that two recent decisions
intended to avoid "potentially arbitrary impositions of the death sentence" nevertheless had
"none of the primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon" (quoting Saffle, 494 U.S.
at 495)).
34. Howard v. United States, 374 F. 3d 1o68, 1o8o (iith Cir. 2004) (cataloguing a long list of
Gideon-based rules that were held retroactive-the right to counsel at plea hearings, at
probation revocation hearings, and for misdemeanors resulting in imprisonment-and
holding that the extension of Gideon to suspended sentences in Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S.
654 (2002), was also retroactive); id at 1076 ("Every extension of the right to counsel from
Gideon through Argersinger has been applied retroactively to collateral proceedings by the
Supreme Court.").
3s. Circuit courts routinely justify denying relief to federal habeas applicants by citing to Gideon
and invoking the watershed rule of procedure exception. See, e.g., United States v. Powell,
691 F.3d 554, 558 (4th Cir. 2012) (recognizing as well entrenched the notion that the "only
procedural rules deserving of retroactive application are those that are comparable in
importance to Gideon v. Wainwright"); Reinhold v. Rozum, 604 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 2010)
(refusing retroactivity because the right in question "has none of the primacy and centrality





overruling Gideon does not make Crawford retroactive. The point is a more
modest, descriptive one: Gideon's legacy is that of justifying onerous
limitations on constitutional remediation. Gideon justifies the retroactivity
doctrine by defining the doctrine in a manner that appears less harsh, less
extreme, and less absolute.
2. General Habeas Limits
A second prominent example of Gideon's shadow relates to some of the
general limits on federal habeas review. In this context, Gideon plays a
substitutive role: because of the right to counsel at trial, other downstream
procedural protections are deemed unnecessary.
The most litigated limits on federal habeas review, the statutory provisions
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), would likely be
regarded as effecting an unconstitutional suspension of the writ, but for the
existence of the Gideon right. While the Supreme Court has not directly ruled
on the constitutionality of many of AEDPA's central provisions, dicta in many
decisions suggests that the robustness of criminal trial procedures, particularly
the right to counsel and the right to jury trial, makes it less constitutionally
dubious to substantially curtail federal postconviction oversight. In one of the
Guantanamo cases, Boumediene v. Bush,"6 for example, the Court takes care to
emphasize that although radically curtailed collateral review procedures in the
military detainee context might amount to a Suspension Clause violation,
"similar limitations on the scope of habeas review may be appropriate" where
the prisoner has enjoyed the benefit of appointed counsel and a full trial."
Under this view, but for the existence of Gideon, the centerpiece of AEDPA and
the primary barrier to relief for most state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),
would not be constitutionally conscionable. 8
Similarly, the procedural default doctrine in federal habeas tends to
prioritize the right to counsel at the expense of nearly all other constitutional
claims. Procedural default is the doctrine by which the State can bar a federal
court from passing constitutional judgment on a claim if, most notably, trial
counsel fails to properly and timely raise the question in state court. The
purpose for this rigid rule that deprives federal courts of reviewing power over
unconstitutional convictions is the notion that trial-level representation must
36. 553 U.S. 723 (20o8).
37. Id. at 790-91.
38. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite", 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 260 (2oo6)
(describing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) as a centerpiece of the modern habeas limits).
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be the "main event."3 ' Notably, the primary check on the harshness of the
procedural default rule is that trial counsel's failure to raise the defaulted claim
may itself be grounds for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that is
cognizable in federal court. That is to say, the right to counsel enjoys a
prominence that justifies substituting the possibility of vindicating other claims
for an opportunity to vindicate only a right-to-counsel claim.4 o
The problem with such an approach is twofold. First, it requires the
prisoner to satisfy a fact-specific showing of deficient performance and
prejudice that is much more difficult to prove than a freestanding
constitutional error.4' Proving deficient performance and prejudice requires the
prisoner, most likely litigating pro se, to overcome the rationalizations and post
hoc strategic justifications of his former defense lawyer who is now working
with the state prosecutors so as to thwart this claim and avoid an ethical rebuke
by the state bar. Second, where the trial attorney's error was a so-called
structural error, such as a failure to object to a patent Batson violation, it
remains an open question whether the errors of counsel require automatic
reversal, or whether a showing of prejudice as is typical of right-to-counsel
claims is necessary.42 To be sure, demonstrating prejudice from a structural
error, like a Batson violation, or the deprivation of a public trial, or the right to
a speedy trial, is nothing short of impossible. 3
In short, the procedural default doctrine ensures that a substantial number
of postconviction claims can only be litigated through the lens of the right to
counsel; vindicating the counsel right substitutes for procedures to vindicate
other rights. The same can be said for doctrines that, like Stone v. Powell,"
preclude the litigation of Fourth Amendment claims on federal habeas while
allowing the same Fourth Amendment violation to serve as the predicate for a
right-to-counsel claim. 4s Again, statutory reforms like AEDPA and judicial
39. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
40. Of course, procedural defaults can also be overcome if the prisoner establishes cause and
prejudice for the default, either through ineffective assistance of counsel or otherwise.
41. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (describing habeas review of
right-to-counsel claims as "doubly" deferential (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct.
1411, 1420 (2009))).
42. BluAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAs MANUAL § 9B:75 (2012) (elaborating on the circuit split
surrounding this issue).
43. It is impossible to show prejudice because a defining feature of structural error is that the
prejudice is "necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 282 (1993). As the Court has explained, "any inquiry into its effect on the outcome of
the case would be purely speculative." Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988).
44. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).




doctrines like procedural default and Stone do not compel the conclusion that
Gideon was wrongly decided and should be abandoned, nor do they require
resolving the question of whether Gideon is the most important right. And as a
normative matter, reasonable people can disagree about whether more federal
habeas review is always better. The point, then, is more general and
descriptive. Many of the most severe statutory and judicial limits on federal
habeas review are rendered tenable because of Gideon. Because a defendant has
a right to counsel, he can both be substantially deprived of federal habeas
review outright, per AEDPA, 6 and many of the claims he can raise are filtered
into the black hole of ineffective assistance of counsel via procedural default.
Such counsel-centered litigation is less hospitable to relief and doctrinal
development than straight merits litigation of the underlying claim."7
3. Challenging a Prior Conviction
A third illustration of Gideon's shadow arises in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding the use of an unconstitutional prior conviction to
enhance one's sentence for a subsequent crime.** The case law in this area is
indicative of the comparative use of Gideon. In the leading case, Custis v. United
46. AEDPA contains a wide range of limitations on relief, including substantive limits such as 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (d) and procedural limits such as the limit on successive petitions, id.
§ 2244 (b), or the statute of limitations, id. § 224 4(d). There is good reason to believe that
due process and the Suspension Clause would be implicated by many of these limits if there
was not a full and fair opportunity for litigation at trial and on appeal. See Justin F. Marceau,
Don't Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in 5 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 64-65 (2010) (arguing that the constitutionality of many aspects of AEDPA
may be contingent upon the existence of full and fair state procedures, including appointed
trial counsel).
47. In addition, litigation filtered through the right to counsel threatens to create a shadow land
of constitutional litigation. That is to say, litigating a right through the lens of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims can distort the content of the predicate right because of the
deferential review permitted under Strickland. Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable
Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BuFF. CluM. L. REv. 535
(1999); Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381,
410 (1996) (describing how the content of rights can be distorted when they are litigated in
frameworks that require deference to state courts or otherwise prevent the federal court
from directly addressing the actual content of the right).
48. One reading of the Court's constitutional sentencing phase cases is that they reflect,
generally, the prioritization of Gideon. Cf John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth
Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1967, 1968 (2005) (explaining
that although the right to confrontation and the right to a jury do not apply to sentencing,
the right to counsel is fully applicable).
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States," the Court held that a defendant need not be afforded the opportunity
to collaterally challenge his or her prior convictions at the time they are being
used to enhance a sentence.so An unconstitutional prior conviction, in other
words, can be used to enhance the sentence for a subsequent conviction. The
sole exception to this rule is Gideon, which the Court recognized as the one
"unique" right because it facilitates the essential "right to be heard.""
According to the Court, when a prior conviction was obtained in violation of
Gideon, the conviction was "pronounced by a court without jurisdiction." 2 Of
course, ordinarily the term "jurisdiction" in a criminal case does not encompass
anything other than the question of whether the court has formal adjudicative
authority over a case (for example, whether the crime was committed within
the jurisdiction). In this sense, a violation of Gideon is no more related to
jurisdiction than a violation of countless other rights such as the right to a
public trial, an indictment, or the right to a speedy trial." But the Court's use of
"jurisdiction" in Custis has a very different meaning, used to connote the
unique stature of Gideon. The right to counsel is jurisdictional only in the
sense that the Court regards it as fundamental to the protection of the innocent
and accuracy of the trial." All other rights, as a comparative matter, do not rise
"to the level of a jurisdictional defect" and cannot be challenged at sentencing.s
Gideon may be a uniquely important right, but there is no widely accepted
theory for regarding Gideon alone as a jurisdictional defect.
49. 511 U.S. 485 (1994).
5o. Id. at 487.
s5. Id.
5. Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
s3. The Court's analogy between a Gideon violation and the lack of jurisdiction has its origins in
the debate about the proper scope of federal habeas jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); see also Johnson, 304
U.S. at 465-68 (citing Frank, 237 U.S. at 309) (noting that habeas review is limited to
correcting errors of jurisdiction, but adopting a broad enough conception of jurisdiction to
allow the reviewing court to look into the underlying substance of a right-to-counsel claim).
54. Leading habeas scholars, looking to define habeas review of jurisdictional defects as broadly
as possible, have argued that a claim is jurisdictional in the habeas sense of the term if it
raises a fundamental constitutional right, as opposed to a legal claim that fails to implicate
the accuracy or fairness of the trial. JAMEs S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS
CoRuus PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.4(d)-(e) (3d ed. 1998). Defined broadly, then,
jurisdiction might include a number of rights beyond merely the right to counsel.
ss. Custis, 511 U.S. at 496 (refusing to permit even an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge
to a prior conviction); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) ("To permit a conviction
obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support






The dichotomy between harmless and structural error provides a fourth
example of Gideon's comparative significance as a justification for limiting
remedies for other constitutional claims. In this context, Gideon helps to
provide a doctrinal footing for this largely indefensible bifurcation.
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has held that not all constitutional
errors entitle a prisoner to a new trial; instead, only the violation of those rights
that are "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error" requires a new trial." In defining this distinction, the Court
initially offered three examples of structural errors requiring automatic
reversal: coerced confessions, biased judges, and Gideon-based claims." The
Court subsequently rejected the notion that coerced confessions were structural
error,s" leaving only the claims of a biased judge and a Gideon violation.5 9 While
subsequent decisions have recognized other constitutional errors as structural
and unfit for harmless error review, the list of such rights is perilously small -
perhaps only a half dozen -and many such rights are linked in some manner to
the right to counsel.6 o It is understood that, unlike other rights, Gideon is
simply "too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial."
Of course, the fact that Gideon has been cast as the paradigmatic example of
structural error does not, standing alone, compel the conclusion that Gideon
sets the standard for defining the class of errors that might qualify as
structural." But the Court's parsimonious recognition of rights as structural in
56. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). A defining feature of structural error is that
the error is not quantifiable. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 (1993).
57. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
58. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308-1o (1991).
59. In announcing the onerous standard for demonstrating that an error is not harmless on
habeas review, the Supreme Court emphasized only Gideon as an example of structural
error. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993).
6o. The right to counsel of choice, for example, is among the small class of errors deemed
structural. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006). Likewise, a violation of
Gideon's mirror image, the right to waive counsel and self-represent, is also structural error.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6 (1975); see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 (listing
rights that enjoy structural error status).
61. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 43 (Stewart, J., concurring).
62. The doctrinal justifications for harmless error may also be more suspect than doctrines like
retroactivity. Cf Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REv. 1,
31, 61 (2002) (noting with regard to retroactivity limits that "lowering of the cost of
innovation may have contributed to the scope of the Warren Court's innovation" but
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conjunction with the celebrated status of Gideon has caused Gideon's
prominence in this realm to metastasize. It is difficult to fully trace the source
of Gideon's prominence in this context, but in many decisions Gideon has
emerged as the defining threshold. This is illustrated by the formulaic language
reflexively employed by some lower court judges in rejecting structural error
status for a right: "[the error at issue in this case does not] resemble the errors
that the United States Supreme Court has previously deemed to be structural
in nature, such as the total denial of counsel in Gideon, [or] the biased trial
judge."6' Given that a claim of judicial bias is factually improbable and nearly
impossible to prove, Gideon stands substantially alone as the index by which
the worthiness of other constitutional rights for structural error status is
gauged.* It has emerged as a sort of talismanic truth that if the right is not of
the same order of magnitude as the Gideon right, as conceived in the abstract,
then the right does not deserve structural error status.6 s
Again, this is not a direct indictment of the Gideon right or a call for its
abandonment. The claim, rather, is more descriptive: the canonical, largely
mythical status of Gideon shapes the process by which courts determine
whether other rights warrant remediation. One need not suggest that many
more rights should be treated as structural in order to appreciate Gideon's role
in this area of law. Rather, my point is simply that Gideon's unrivaled rhetorical
status facilitates the indefensible and untenable bifurcation. The distinction
between structural errors and harmless errors is actually much less than it
seems. Indeed, as a practical matter, Gideon errors could be just as amenable to
harmless error analysis as most other constitutional violations. Even if the
Gideon right is violated, where the evidence of guilt is absolutely overwhelming
such that there is no question of guilt, it is strange to say that Gideon is
somehow more structural or less amenable to harmless error. 6 In many
instances, a Gideon violation might be just as harmless as other constitutional
violations that are routinely regarded as harmless by courts, such as
involuntary confessions.
explaining that because "harmless error does not have the capacity to change behaviors over
time . . . [a]n error that is harmless in case one will likely be harmless in later cases").
63. See, e.g., State v. Colon, 885 N.E.2d 917, 928 (Ohio 2oo8) (O'Donnell, J., dissenting),
overruled by State v. Horner, 935 N.E.2d 26 (Ohio 2013).
64. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to
Coerced Confessions, 105 HARv. L. REV. 152, 165 (1991) (describing judicial bias and the
deprivation of counsel as the "two paradigmatic 'structural errors"').
6s. In addition, when the Court lists examples of structural error, Gideon "is conspicuously
first." Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified Theory ofRetroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 105,
133 (2009/2010).




The point, then, is not that Gideon caused the distinction between harmless
and structural error; instead, the point is that Gideon, because of its abstract
prominence, justifies and fortifies an otherwise precarious and untenable
distinction between structural and harmless errors. By serving as the
paradigmatic example of structural error, Gideon serves as a doctrinal
justification for a largely meaningless distinction.
B. Scholarly Proposals that Illustrate Gideon's Shadow
In addition to established judicial doctrines that entrench limitations on the
vindication of non-Gideon rights because they lack the primacy of Gideon
(comparative), or because Gideon provides sufficient protection itself
(substitutive), prominent scholars of the past and present have urged
legislative and judicial reforms that would limit federal oversight of state
convictions because of the importance of the Gideon right. For purposes of this
essay, I will mention just two illustrative examples.
The first example is one of the seminal works in the habeas corpus field,
Judge Friendly's 1970 article, Is Innocence Irrelevant?67 Responding to the
Warren Court's habeas reforms, Judge Friendly argued that disruption to the
finality of a state conviction is only conscionable when "the prisoner
supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence."6 8 But
an oft-overlooked aspect of Judge Friendly's argument in support of more
limited federal habeas review was his explicit recognition that our criminal
justice system "has been steadily improving, particularly because of the
Supreme Court's decision that an accused, whatever his financial means, is
entitled to the assistance of counsel at every critical stage.",6 The core insight
here, for better or worse, was that Gideon promised to make the state process
more reliable, and thus federal habeas review was less necessary. Such
reasoning is not inconsistent with the purpose and promise of Gideon, but it
reflects the way in which Gideon casts a shadow by substitution-the existence
of a constitutionally entrenched right to counsel justifies limiting access to
postconviction remediation.
67. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 142 (1970).
68. Id. at 142 ("My thesis is that, with a few important exceptions, convictions should be subject
to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a
colorable claim of innocence.").
69. Id. at 145.
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An additional body of recent scholarship urges limiting other rights not
because of Gideon's prominence but because of its cost.70 Perhaps no one makes
this case more forcefully than Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann.7 ' Following
up on a groundbreaking empirical study of federal habeas corpus, these two
scholars have focused on the critical importance of competent trial counsel in
justifying a radically limited scope of federal habeas review. The limitations
proposed by these scholars are actually the mirror image of previous calls for
abridging habeas, including those of Paul Bator or Judge Friendly, insofar as
King and Hoffmann urge a limitation on the vindication of other federal rights
as a way to save money to invest in the Gideon right, rather than justifying
limits on other rights because of the existence of the counsel right.72
Specifically, rather than emphasizing Gideon in the abstract and on this basis
calling for a reduction of other rights as unnecessary, King and Hoffmann
grapple with the reality of a failing Gideon right and urge that resources be
divested from federal habeas review and redeployed to improve indigent
representation at the trial level.7 ' Although it does not address the likelihood
that financial resources saved by curtailing federal habeas review would
actually be reinvested in state indigent defense funding,74 this argument reflects
the substitutive approach to Gideon and can be summarized in four basic steps:
(a) the right to counsel is of preeminent importance; (b) the right is currently
suffering from underfunding; (c) cutting federal habeas review (even for
claims of ineffective assistance) will save money that can be reinvested in
trial-level representation; and (d) this "front-end reform" of funding the right
to counsel "promises to do more good" overall.7s In short, it is the importance
of the Gideon right and of actualizing it through better funding that serves as
the policy rationale for curtailing federal review of other constitutional claims.71
70. See, e.g., Barton, supra note i, at 1233 (arguing that the right to counsel should not apply to
misdemeanants because it dilutes Gideon); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor
Representation, 49 WM. &MARY L. REV. 461, 488-89 (2007).
71. NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES,
ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011).
72. See id. at 14-17.
73. King and Hoffmann argue that the "federalism crisis" that justified robust habeas review
-states defiantly ignoring the constitution-has passed and thus, the money spent on
federal habeas would be better spent on "improvements to state defense representation
services." Id. at 15-16.
74. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense ofNoncapital Habeas:
A Response to Hofinann and King, 96 CORNEL L. REv. 435, 467-71 (2011).
75. KING& HOFFMANN, supra note 71, at 88.
76. Although under the AEDPA regime, habeas relief in noncapital cases is "microscopically"




One need not debate the normative claims underlying these premises to
recognize that this reform is another example of prioritizing Gideon -precisely
because it is viewed as a gateway right and a right that best protects
innocence-at the expense of the vindication of other, even obvious
deprivations of constitutional rights that may come to light post-trial.
To recap, then, there is a common if not ubiquitous strand of reasoning in
judicial doctrine and academic commentary suggesting the existence of a
doctrinal quid pro quo-in exchange for the grand right of Gideon, prisoners
must forgo remedies for other constitutional harms. The prominence and
accuracy-serving function of the Gideon right can both cause and justify limits
on the scope of remedies for other rights. Sometimes this takes the form of a
comparative assessment, and other times it is more of substitution effect, but in
either case the net effect is a Gideon-based justification for denying a prisoner
access to another right."
III. ENVISIONING A LEGACY THAT GIDEON COULD BE PROUD OF
Having argued that Gideon has cast a judicial and scholarly pall over other
rights - either as a matter of resource tradeoffs or doctrinal principle - this final
Part will briefly sketch out a possible vision for overcoming this rights
hierarchy. Whereas many of the doctrines that rely on Gideon as a justification
for limiting other rights focus on the innocence-protecting function of counsel,
it is possible to read Gideon broadly so as to facilitate a vision of the
Constitution as a set of living protections that are not particularly contingent
Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 585, 6o (finding, for example, that suppression motions based on
confessions succeed in fewer than five percent of cases; out of 7,035 cases studied, only five
convictions (0.071%) were lost as the result of a Miranda suppression). It is commonplace to
regard the exclusionary rule as an important tool of behavior modification for law
enforcement officers, even though it appears to result in relatively few actual instances of
suppression. To be sure, the actual benefits and costs of the exclusionary rule may well be
higher than Nardulli concludes because when state courts know they will be reviewed on
federal habeas, they may be more solicitous of the constitutional protections at issue. Thus,
habeas may be providing benefits that are not fully captured by the empirical data. The same
empirical underestimation appears to be present in the Miranda context. See Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 393 (1996)
(arguing that these figures fail to account for the confessions that are not obtained at all, not
just those that are suppressed, because of the provision of Miranda warnings).
7. It is worth reiterating that I do not necessarily reject the view that Gideon is the most
important criminal procedure right. Moreover, the claim is not strictly causal - that the right
to counsel has caused the other limitations identified in Part III. The point, rather, is to
highlight the paradoxical doctrinal relationship between Gideon and other rights such that
Gideon is employed by courts and scholars to prop up limitations on other rights.
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on historical practices, innocence, accuracy, or the limiting of other rights.," If
Gideon's core mandate is one of fundamental fairness in our criminal
processes, then two cases, both decided in 2012, have the potential to be
landmark decisions in forecasting an application of right-to-counsel principles
in the service of facilitating rather than impeding other rights. These cases tend
to disentangle Gideon from innocence and facilitate procedural mechanisms for
the discovery and articulation of new rights.
The first case is Martinez v. Ryan,so which imports into the realm of
postconviction review a preoccupation with fairness rather than accuracy." In
Martinez, the Court held that a procedural default that would otherwise
entirely bar federal habeas review of a claim can be overcome through a
showing that postconviction counsel was ineffective." in Martinez, the Court
explicitly relies on Gideon and its due process undergirding in order to expand,
rather than contract, the scope of federal habeas procedures." This may be the
first time in over a decade that the Supreme Court has relied on Gideon in
support of an expansion of federal habeas review rather than a contraction.
Accordingly, Martinez potentially foretells an era in which the guiding hand of
counsel is recognized as a gateway to other rights rather than a rationale for
curtailing them.
In candor, however, the legacy of Martinez is substantially unknown;
indeed, it is even possible that Martinez will ultimately prove to be another
example of the primacy of the counsel right denigrating the remediation of
other rights. On the one hand, in recognizing an equitable right to counsel in
postconviction proceedings, Martinez does threaten to swing open the federal
courthouse doors to a variety of federal claims that were defaulted in state court
because of the ineptitude of state postconviction counsel. But, on the other
hand, the precise limitation on the procedural default doctrine announced in
78. Barton, supra note 15, at 1232 ("Among the cases that made up the due process revolution of
the 1960s and early 1970s, Gideon and its progeny were in the forefront of the 'living
constitution' cases.").
79. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Gideon . . . established that no matter how strong its historical pedigree, a procedure
prohibited by the Sixth Amendment (failure to appoint counsel in certain criminal cases)
violates 'fundamental fairness' .....
80. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
s. The same year that Gideon was decided, the Court sought to entrench a much
more capacious view of federal habeas review. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963)
("Although . . . [habeas] is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably
intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty.").
8z. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.




Martinez arises out of a true, trial-related, Gideon concern. That is to say, in
recognizing a right to federal review despite a state procedural default,
Martinez holds only that a default relating to the right to trial counsel may be
excused.8 ' Citing Gideon, the Court explains that: it is an "obvious truth the
idea that any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him," adding "[i] ndeed,
the right to counsel is the foundation for our adversary system."s On its face,
then, Martinez is a Gideon-specific right."
Nonetheless, there is good reason to anticipate that Martinez will ultimately
be applied so as to excuse procedural defaults for claims other than the right to
counsel." Martinez contains language suggesting that the equitable concerns
relating to the opportunity for one full and fair opportunity to litigate
constitutional claims, either in state or federal court, would apply with equal
force to claims such as Brady" or juror misconduct that could not be raised on
direct appeal. Most notably, in explaining its rationale for excusing a
procedural default, the Court emphasized that claims requiring an examination
of facts beyond the trial record, such as the right to counsel, are often best
suited for postconviction review.8' Read broadly, then, Martinez recognizes the
importance of competent postconviction counsel as a means of protecting any
84. Id. (citing Gideon and explaining that "the right to counsel is the foundation for our
adversary system" such that "[e]ffective trial counsel preserves claims to be considered on
appeal and in federal habeas proceedings") (citiations omitted). Lawrence Marshall
previously concluded that "the Court should recognize that the only way to guarantee a
right to effective assistance of counsel at trial is to guarantee counsel for post-conviction
challenges to the adequacy of the counsel who represented the defendant at trial." Marshall,
supra note 11, at 962.
8s. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.
86. More to the point, the Court did not recognize a general constitutional right to counsel on
postconviction review. Id. at 1320 ("[The holding] permits a State to elect between
appointing counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural
default. . . .").
87. Notably, in other contexts, such as assessing the retroactivity of Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.
Ct. 1473 (2010), Gideon has been used as a justification for limiting the reach even of other
right-to-counsel-based claims. See, e.g., People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 899 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 2010) ([The] rule of "Padilla is not as sweeping and fundamental as that of Gideon, and
it does not, therefore, rise to the status of a watershed rule that must be applied
retroactively.").
88. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the disclosure of material evidence
favorable to the defendant).
8g. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318 ("Abbreviated deadlines to expand the record on direct appeal
may not allow adequate time for an attorney to investigate the ineffective-assistance
claim.").
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rights that are not readily cognizable on direct appeal.9o Indeed, conceived of in
capacious terms, Martinez serves to substantially undermine and defuse what
threatened to be the two greatest limitations on federal habeas relief in
decades: the AEDPA and Cullen v. Pinholster.9'
The second, perhaps more clear-cut example of a case evincing a
right-enhancing conception of Gideon is Lafler v. Cooper.92 Lafler goes some
distance towards defining the right to counsel in a way that is liberated from
cramped notions of verdict accuracy and innocence. In Lafler, the defendant
received inadequate assistance of counsel prior to trial that contributed to his
decision to reject a plea offer. The most salient feature of the Lafler decision is
the fact that Lafler was convicted following a full and fair trial and did not have
any claim that the jury verdict was unreliable.93 The critical question, then, was
whether the right to counsel was primarily an adjunct to a fair trial right and an
accurate verdict. The Court held that the right to counsel "is not so narrow in
its reach" and explained that, even when the "defendant's guilt or innocence" is
not at issue, the right to counsel can still be violated because the right to
counsel is "not designed simply to protect the trial."' The simplicity of the
Court's recognition that a fair trial is "insufficient . . . as a backstop that
inoculates [other] errors"9 s masks the potentially profound implications of this
decision. In a nutshell, Lafler explodes the conception of the right to counsel as
go. Other scholars suggest that postconviction costs, including those associated with the
Martinez decision, further dilute the already limited stream of money being spent on
ensuring adequate trial counsel representation. Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance
After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2455-56 (2013); King & Hoffmann, supra note 71, at 15-16.
However, this critique seems to assume a basic fungibility of money that is inconsistent with
political realities. In states where a statute provides for an office of postconviction counsel,
this money does not come out of the state defender budget, and the elimination of such
offices has not led to increases in trial-level funding.
91. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). The decision holds that federal habeas review of a claim adjudicated in
state court is limited to the record before the state court. Habeas lawyers know that factual
development is one of the key predictors of success on habeas review, so Pinholster threatens
to produce a stifling federal framework. However, a broad reading of Martinez may provide
a work-around for most Pinholster-barred claims. Specifically, the failure of postconviction
counsel to develop key facts in support of a claim during state postconviction proceedings
may make the claim unadjudicated and therefore technically defaulted. However, Martinez
may provide the basis for overcoming that default. Such an application of Martinez would
have a profoundly rights-enhancing impact. See, e.g., Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054 (9th
Cir. 2012).
92. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). Notably, the same day the Court decided Lafler, a related case,
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), was also handed down.
93. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386.
94. Id. at 1385-86.




primarily an accuracy- or innocence- protecting right, and breathes life into a
more capacious fairness orientation for the right to counsel.
Such a holding is nothing short of groundbreaking. A firm recognition that
the right to counsel is not primarily an accuracy-enhancing right has
implications for a variety of the doctrines that rely on Gideon as a justification
for curtailing other rights. If the right to counsel does not exist primarily to
protect innocent defendants and ensure the accuracy of trials, then the
retroactivity doctrine's current account of what constitutes a watershed rule of
procedure and the defining features of the structural error classification, among
other things, deserve to be revisited. In short, it is plausible that Martinez and
Lafler signal a new era in the Court's application of Gideon-an era that casts
considerable doubt on the doctrines that rely on Gideon's innocence- and trial-
related functioning as a justification for limiting other rights. It is possible that
Gideon's shadow is receding and that the right to counsel could soon play less
of a role in justifying limitations on the vindication of other rights.
CONCLUSION
The biblical story of Gideon's Trumpet is the story of a man who, when
tasked with conquering a much larger enemy, resorts to trickery. Gideon arms
his men with trumpets and torches so that the noise and light is of such
intensity as to fool his enemies into believing they were out-armed and
outmanned. There is a very real danger that the Gideon of criminal procedure
has been dressed in flashy rhetoric and bombastic descriptions to such a degree
as to impede relief for other, noncounsel constitutional rights. Although
indigent representation systems across the country are in a state of financial
and resource crisis, time and again, the bright lights of the monumental Gideon
decision have served as a justification for curtailing other rights. Gideon is
larger in principle than in practice, and its rhetoric has provided a shadowy
cover for practical limits on other rights. Perhaps, however, as Gideon turns
fifty, there is room for measured optimism about the use of the right to counsel
and its corollaries to facilitate rather than impede the remediation of rights
unrelated to innocence or trial-level representation. Read broadly, cases like
Lafler and Martinez suggest a very different tune for the next fifty years of
Gideon's Trumpet.
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